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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ARNOLD JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 45288
Madison County Case No.
CR-2017-297

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, upon his guilty plea to felony DUI?

Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On February 4, 2017, Johnson drove to a gas station, purchased several 24-ounce cans of
beer, and then proceeded to drive while “he was drinking” the beer and “throwing the beer cans
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out the window.” (PSI, pp.4-5, 32. 1) Johnson failed to stop at a “stop sign and red flashing
light” and crashed into Robert and Desma Rife’s vehicle as they were traveling through the
intersection, causing their car to “lose control and spin completely around.” (PSI, pp.32, 47.)
Although Johnson’s front bumper and license plate were ripped from his vehicle due to the
impact, Johnson left them “sitting in the roadway” and fled the scene without checking on the
occupants of the vehicle he had hit. (PSI, p.32.)
Officers responded to the scene and, shortly thereafter, located Johnson as he “pulled into
[his] residence.” (PSI, p.38.) Johnson acknowledged that he “should have” stopped “for the car
he hit,” but he “didn’t stop because he had too much alcohol today.” (PSI, p.32.) While
performing field sobriety tests – which he failed – Johnson had difficulty maintaining his balance
and repeatedly stated, “‘I’m drunk.’” (PSI, p.33.) Officers transported Johnson to the jail, where
he submitted to breath testing, which yielded BAC results of .144/.156. (PSI, p.34.)
The state charged Johnson with felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years) and misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident involving damage. (R., pp.33-35.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Johnson pled guilty to both charges and the state agreed to not file
a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.46-47; 4/24/17 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-25; p.22, L.4 – p.27,
L.21.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed. (R.,
pp.50-51.) Johnson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.5254.)
Johnson asserts his sentence for felony DUI is excessive in light of his depression,
“moderate” risk to reoffend, period of sobriety prior to the “accident,” and because his mother
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “JOHNSON
SEALED PRESENTENCE REPORT.pdf.”
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would like him to “come home” to help with chores. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5; Johnson Exhibit
Letters, pp.2, 5, 7-8, 11, 13.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years) is 10 years. I.C. § 18-8005(6), -8005(9). The district court imposed a unified sentence of
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10 years, with five years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.50-51.)
On appeal, Johnson contends that an “especially mitigating factor is [his] mental health,” as,
“[f]or the first time in his life, [he] was diagnosed with depression after being arrested for the
instant offense,” and he “has learned” “that’s the root of [his] problem.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4;
5/31/17 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-16.) However, in 2013, while on a CAPP rider for a prior felony DUI,
Johnson was “able to identify that if he does not take care of his reported depression and anxiety,
it hinders his recovery efforts.” (PSI, p.76.) As such, it is clear that Johnson has been aware of
his mental health issues for quite some time, as well as their impact on his substance abuse
issues. Indeed, at the time of his arrest for the instant offense, Johnson told officers that he
“drinks to cope with depression,” yet it appears that despite this awareness, Johnson has never
made any effort to obtain treatment for his mental health issues while in the community. (PSI,
p.34.)
Furthermore, Johnson’s choice to consume alcohol to cope with his depression does not
necessitate that he drive while (or after) consuming alcohol. The instant offense is Johnson’s
ninth DUI conviction and, while on felony probation for his last DUI, Johnson routinely drove
his mother’s vehicle while his license was suspended, consumed alcohol on a regular basis, and
even admitted that he consumed alcohol while driving. (PSI, pp.6-11, 70.) Johnson’s repeated
decisions to endanger the community by driving while intoxicated are not merely the result of
relapses triggered by depression, but the result of his ongoing criminal thinking and actions.
Although Johnson’s relapse may be explained by his unwillingness or inability to deal with his
depression without consuming alcohol, his justification for his relapse does not excuse his
subsequent decision to drive and place society at risk.
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At sentencing, the state addressed Johnson’s abysmal history of criminal conduct and
refusal to abide by the conditions of community supervision, the danger he presents to society,
and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite numerous prior treatment opportunities and
legal sanctions.

(5/31/17 Tr., p.14, L.8 – p.17, L.1 (Appendix A).)

The district court

subsequently articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth in
detail its reasons for imposing Johnson’s sentence. (5/31/17 Tr., p.18, L.8 – p.37, L.8 (Appendix
B).) The state submits that Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons
more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state
adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendices A and B.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Johnson’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of March, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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